Following a thorough
reading of Laws III, we may conclude that there is an underlying historical
concept [1] in the text. Weil[2] justly maintains that there
is an intentional selection of historical facts and that Plato had enough
documentation on real facts to rely on. Whatever the case, the chain of
facts and the selected axis for the account show an underlying notion of
history, since we can appreciate an idea of general unit according to which
people evolve toward vice and virtue, outlined in 676 a-b;additionally reinforced in the ideas of the decline of civilizations
[3] and the parallelism between
city and man [4].
But
there is nohistorical doctrine explicitly
asserted. Nowhere does Plato say something like “philosophy of history is
such and such”. The platonic explanation does not look for a Hegelian type
of answer; to assert it would be an error. Now then, if we consider a philosophy
of history as a vision of history from the point of view of reason, or the
concept of history as a unit –not in the sense of progress- we may assume
that there is an underlying philosophy of history in Plato’s account.
***
Book
III initially searches for the causes of change in cities and political systems.
Here, the assertion of the Athenian stranger in the sense thatsocieties always evolve at the same time toward virtue and toward vice,
676 a-b,call for an explanation that
will lead to the historical account. In Gaiser´s opinion [5],
Plato’s metaphysical view of history resides in these opposite tendencies
of historical evolution.
However, we believe
that in Laws III, the terms “virtue”, “ignorance”, and “knowledge” are clearly
used in two different senses. When keeping in mind such distinctions, the
concept of evolution in two opposite directions becomes less evident. Let’s
clarify the idea:
In
677 b, Plato describes the first people after the flood, the mountaineers, as
lacking in knowledge and experience for the political art, the earning of riches,
or the justification of an ethics. We infer that they lack enough sophistication
to enjoy the fine arts or the theater. Their only concern is survival. They
live in small groups, they show respect for the gods. They are good but incapable
of accounting for it. Plato talks about simplicity, and ignorance. Their virtue
is like Kephalus´s virtue in Republic.
In 678 b, when the
Athenian questions Kleinias, Plato hints at a first sense of vice and virtue:
“the men of that period, who had had no experience of city life
in all its splendour and squalor, ever became totally wicked or totally virtuous?”
[6]
In
accordance with this passage, Plato would assume a sense of “virtue” in
which it would be associated with the “vulgar” sense of “ignorance” that
we will analyze later. Virtue would be equivalent to “innocence” or “ingenuousness”.
However, we know that, for Plato, virtue in its most genuine sense demands
knowledge and years of training. And knowledge is about principles. Plato
himself goes on to explain (696b -697a) that temperance is a central virtue
as it is always underlying in all other virtues like justice and courage.
Thus, the text would
point to two senses of “virtue”, a first one which involves the ingenious
virtuous, with no possibility of accounting for his behavior, and a second
one, in which “virtue” implies temperance and the virtues associated with
the knowledge of principles.
But
how then do we understand the initial statementregarding the "progress toward virtue" of societies? As far
as “virtue” is concerned, the most perfect people are the first one. If none
of the people described evolve toward the virtue of temperance, nor toward
the knowledge ofprinciples,what are they “evolving” toward? Is it possible
to infer a sense of “vulgar” virtue, understanding “virtue” as “sophistication”
and “well-being”? In this case, there would only be “progress” toward the
possession of wealth, toward a mundane knowledge of art - in its worst sense:
that of mere imitation ofappearances
-, the forge, the war, etc.From an
opposite standpoint, Plato considers “virtue” in its more genuine sense as
the totality of virtues which cannot exclude temperance and combined with
the knowledge to validate it.
Having
explain the meanings of “virtue”, let us now proceed to the meanings of “ignorance”.
In 689a,Plato asserts that “ignorance”
is: “The kind involved
when man thinks something is fine and good, but loathes it instead of liking
it, and conversely when he likes and welcomes what he believes is wicked and
unjust. I maintain that this disaccording between his feelings of pleasure
and pain and his rational judgment constitutes the very lowest depth of ignorance”.
“Ignorance” is thus revealed as a rejoicing in the unjust and the
wicked as well as in allowing oneself to be guided toward the lowest part
of the soul. In 689 b, Plato reinforces this idea: “So when the
soul quarrels with knowledge or opinion or reason, its natural ruling principles,
you have there what I call “folly”” .[7]
In
689c-d, he asserts,
They must be reproved for their ignorance, even if their ability to reason
is outstanding and they have worked hard at every nice accomplishment that
makes a man quick-witted. It is those whose characters are at the other extreme
who must be called “wise”, even if, as the saying is, “they cannot read, they
cannot swim”; and it is this sensible people who must be given the office
of state. You see my friends without concord, how could you ever get even
a glimmer of sound judgment? It’s out of question. But we should be entirely
justified in styling the greatest and most splendid concord of all “the greatest
wisdom” [8]In my opinion, we find here two meanings of “ignorance”
and two of “knowledge” or “intelligence”. In the former case, “ignorance”
in a “vulgar” sense would be not knowing how to read or write; and in a “platonic”
sense, it would imply ignorance of principles or definitions. As regards “intelligence”,
a “vulgar” sense would entail knowing how to read, write, and swim, and a
“platonic” one would combine wisdom and temperance and not necessarily implya literate person.
Then,
if we link these “double” meanings of “virtue” and “knowledge” with the idea
ofthe “progress” of societies toward virtue and
vice expressed at the beginning of Book III, we cannot assert the existence
of a “double tendency” nor a “progress” toward virtue in historic evolution,
if we understand “virtue” in a “platonic” sense, but just a tendency toward
vice and decay.
We can only speak of “progress" if we
understand it in its most generally understood sense, that is, as an economic,
cultural or mundane progress. A “progress” in terms of enrichment, power,
the enjoyment of the arts and a “happy” life around banquets and parties.
There is an increase in knowledge, but “knowledge” in a “vulgar” sense: people
progress in their capacity to read and write. It would only imply a “progress
toward virtue” in a sense of“virtue”
and of “progress” that Plato himself would never accept, and more in conformity
with the vulgar notions of such terms.
But if we understand “progress toward virtue”
as an increase in temperance combined with the knowledge of principles, this
is not validated and the tendency, I insist, is exclusively toward vice and
decay.
***
Once
clarified the different senses of “virtue”, “knowledge” and “ignorance” and
their relationship with the problematic statement of “progress toward virtue”,
let us proceed to explain why, in our opinion, it could be said that a historical
philosophy is present in this book of the Laws,
perhaps not explicitly theorized but underlying in the accounts of the past.
In the first place, from that exposed in the
previous section, we may conclude that Plato conceives history as a process
in which decadence is natural, since the natural “progress” ofcivilizations is toward an increased complexity of social relationships,
toward power, toward wealth, etc. Therefore, if we keep in mind the concept
of “platonic” virtue, we may assert that societies subjectedto historical evolution, undergo involution.
Also,
Book III aims to search the facts of the past for the causes of change in
civilizations, and it is with this aimin
mind that the fact of the past will be analyzed. This is what the Athenian
proposes in 676c. The final intention is to avoid change in the perfect city
to be founded.
Based
on his used of the account of the past facts, we may dare to state that Plato
regards history as a tool that, when used properly, can help us uncover the
causes of the decline of civilizations. Note that we speak of decline and
not of evolution, because according to what we have explained, there wouldn’t
be a natural progress toward the Good, but toward error. Plato considers that
as man gets richer and sophisticated, when he lacks the demands of a hard
and effortful life, he loses direction and mistakenly pursues the Good in
the satisfaction of sensual pleasures. He who owns greater possessions, would
want more, thus generating inequality and injustice, as can be inferred from
from 679c and 695c-e. This debauchery leads to disobedience of the laws, as
in the case of Athens (668b, 701b),anddecline
and corruption will consequently follow. Only a city with wise and virtuous
men who lay down laws in accordance with the supreme Good will manage to avoid
this process.
The
pessimistic conception of the evolution of history, the tendency of societies
toward corruption – ideas shared by Plato with his culture – can be derived
from his portrait of civilizations since all disappear hopelessly because
of man. (677b-680a, 682b, 683d, 694a, 698b)
Historical
evolution tends naturally toward corruption. All civilizations deteriorate
hopelessly because of the ignorant man. Progress toward virtue doesn't depend
on mere historical evolution, it demands an effort. Plato believes that “virtue”
results from the deepening of knowledge and the training of will, regardless
of history, and that it can extend to almost everybody through education.
In the Laws, the topic of education
will be broadly discussed in later passages, although here, in Book III, we
see some indications that allow us to presume that it will be based on severity,
fear and obedience of the laws, and self-control.
The
course of history may be altered, thanks to education andgood government. This frees human kind, to a certain extent, from a
causal determinism that leads to a hopeless decline and that could be implicit
in this conception. I believe that in this sense, Plato is not considering
history as scientific, if for “scientific" we understand that which is
totally foreseeable and determined.
Plato
also uses the report of facts to expose his ideas regarding a perfect civilization.
He illustrates, throughout history, the presence of vice and virtue in humanity
since the beginning of time. He reveals the mistakes arisen from a lack of
moderation (691c-e, 701e) and from an ignorance of the art of platonic politics.
The
art of politics to which Plato refers differs from the vulgar one, because
it seeks the well-being of man and city, though not a well-being based on
wealth, comfort and sophistication, but one concerned with man's more sublime
side, his divine aspect.
And
hence, man and city are the same thing, as in the case of the Persian
emperors, because he who is guided by his reasoning power, he whose lower
parts obey the upper ones with moderation, is a man who rules himself according
to the Good; and the same should apply to the city; the manyshould obey the one who guides them wisely to the Good. In Magnesia,
they will obey the wise laws dictated; in the Republic, the philosopher-king.
In
Laws III there is therefore an underlying
idea of history as an instrument in the service of platonic philosophy, a
history as a process that leads civilization toward decadence, a history as
a set of facts partially determined and susceptible of being altered by the
man able to attain true virtue, a history that manifests itself as a vital
process in the birth, growth and death of civilizations, a history that can
uncover the causes of current facts, a history that is a collection of stories
preserved in myths and in the memory of men.
***
[1] Interest in the history of philosophy originated in the XVIII century
with the encyclopedist notion of history as a unit and the expression of
progress. The historical sense behind this notion developed with the romantics
and specially with Hegel andthe
definition of history as the self-development of the Spirit and hence, as
an evolution in which all previous moments are necessary in as much as partial
manifestations of the Spirit, which includes all previous phases in each
stage. Thus, the history ofphilosophy
is a process, but at the same time a progress in the sense that every moment
is consideredsuperior in value to
the previous moment. Since the end of XVIII and the beginning of XIX, the
history of philosophy appeared as a philosophical discipline, but steeped
in a philosophy of history or rather of a metahistory as a result of the
notions of process and of the essential unit of the spirit. Ferrater Mora
(1965), I, p. 685.
[3] All civilizations analyzed by Plato in book III die or decay without hope.
The first group disappears due to natural causes (677a). The primitive one
(677b-680a), Troy (682b), Argos and Messene (683d), the Persian Empire (694a),
Athens (698b), become corrupted for diverse human causes: progress, development
of war weapons and fortresses, broken pacts between people and sovereigns,
corrupted education, unrestricted freedom: all of which break the necessary
balance between freedom and oppression. The exception to the rule is Sparta, who thanks to its
random institutions (the birth of the twin kings) and the almost “divine”
wisdom of Lycurgus, manages to maintain the balance of power. There is a
marked pessimistic notion of human conduct in Plato, since only chance and
those with a certain divine power, or those who have been educated according
to the platonic principles, seem to have the power to revert the process.
(688c).
[4] In 684c,
and 687d Plato compares individual human behavior with the State, by reference
to education, the doctor and the gymnastics professor. In 689a and 689b the
comparison is explicit. In 685d, the fate of the Persian
Empire depends on the education and character of its emperor.
In
fact, the city is the result of political organization achieved by men and
it cannot be compared with a living organism, as an individual, subjected
to biological corruption. However, Plato considers that a man and many men
are the same thing, and that the ruling of people is the same as the ruling
of oneself.
[5] K. Gaiser,(1991), p.
116. “Queste due opposte tendenze dell´evoluzione storica vengono espresse in modo
particolarmente chiaro nell terzo libro delle Leggi.”
